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SUMMARY 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a small but growing share of the global 
natural gas market. Global consumption of natural gas rose by 2.4 per cent 
between 2005 and 2015. The majority (70 per cent) of consumption relies 
on indigenous production. Most of the rest comes from pipelines, with LNG-
sourced natural gas growing from seven to nine per cent of consumption 
between 2005 and 2015.
Global LNG imports increased rapidly between 2005 and 2011, rising from 193 
to 334 billion cubic metres annually. They have stayed relatively constant since, 
averaging 324 billion cubic metres annually. Europe and Asia and Oceania are 
the primary recipients of LNG imports, accounting for 90 per cent of global 
imports from 2005 to 2015.
An increase in global LNG liquefaction terminals accompanied the rise in 
imports. From 2005 to 2015, the number of liquefaction terminals increased 
from 20 terminals in 13 countries to 38 terminals in 20 countries. Total global 
liquefaction capacity rose by almost 90 per cent, mostly in the Middle East. 
The growth in LNG is largely attributable to an increasing mismatch between 
areas of natural gas supply and demand. As of 2016, the world’s natural gas 
reserves were estimated at 194,782 billion cubic metres, with the Middle East 
and Russia and Eurasia having the largest shares, respectively.
Despite having smaller reserves, the largest gas-producing region is North 
America, which accounted for 26 per cent of global production from 2005 
to 2015. Production in North America – and specifically the United States – 
steadily increased over this period as a result of advances in horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing and a corresponding surge in shale gas. 
1More so than other energy sources, the gaseous nature of natural gas has historically 
made it difficult to trade. This contributed to a rise in regional markets, with corresponding 
variation in prices. From 2010 to 2015 the LNG price in Asia was significantly higher than 
natural gas prices in Europe, which were in turn higher than prices in North America. 
These price differentials incited what was frequently referred to as the “LNG race,” with 
project proponents seeking to lock-in supply contracts and secure final investment 
decisions for new LNG liquefaction terminals. 
Although price differentials still remain, they have narrowed considerably since the start 
of the oil price crash in 2014. Lower prices, combined with a growing surplus of LNG 
liquefaction capacity, has led to a significant slowdown in the approval of new LNG 
liquefaction terminals in recent years.
Looking ahead, however, another opportunity for LNG development lies on the horizon. 
Even if governments enact stringent measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions, natural 
gas production and consumption is expected to keep growing – the only fossil fuel to do 
so. Forecasts also suggest that the mismatch between areas of supply and demand will 
continue to become more pronounced.
Production growth in the Middle East, Russia and Eurasia, North America and Africa is 
forecast to exceed growth in demand. Correspondingly, all three regions are anticipated 
to have a growing natural gas surplus through to 2040. In contrast, Europe and Asia and 
Oceania both currently have natural gas deficits that are also forecast to grow. 
New infrastructure will be critical to getting natural gas to consumers. While pipelines 
remain the cheaper option for transporting natural gas, Russia and Eurasia is the only 
major producing region with significant or planned pipeline access to external demand 
markets. As a result, it is expected that a second wave of new LNG capacity will be 
required by the mid-2020s.
Having missed out on the first LNG race, this second development window offers the most 
promising opportunity for proposed Canadian export facilities to enter the global LNG 
market. With numerous proposals for new liquefaction terminals on standby around the 
globe, however, this next wave of LNG development will again be highly competitive. It 
is therefore important that Canadian firms and investors act now to manage investment 
risks and position themselves to proceed with proposed projects as soon as the next 
window opens. Moreover, Canadian governments have an important role in ensuring the 
stability of policy and regulatory environments underpinning Canada’s attractiveness as 
an investment destination.
2INTRODUCTION
Demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) is primarily driven by its use as a transportation mode 
for the export of natural gas via tidewater port facilities.1 As such, the demand for LNG has strong 
roots in the international demand for natural gas. 
Global natural gas demand is growing and known reserves are more than sufficient for the 
foreseeable future. However, there is also a growing regional mismatch between areas of increasing 
demand and increasing supply. Specifically, growing natural gas deficits are forecast for Asia, 
where natural gas demand is rapidly growing, and for Europe, where growth in natural gas demand 
is more moderate but significant production declines are expected. In contrast, growing natural gas 
surpluses are forecast for the Middle East and Russia and Eurasia, which have the world’s largest 
reserves of natural gas, as well as North America where technological advances in natural gas 
extraction are leading to rapid production increases in the United States.
While natural gas has historically been traded primarily by pipeline, the growing regional 
mismatch is largely between geographically distinct areas for which the trade of natural gas via 
pipeline is not feasible or for which pipeline infrastructure does not yet exist. This is expected to 
lead to a strong increase in global LNG demand among net consuming countries (those for which 
domestic consumption is greater than domestic production).2 Net producing countries (those for 
which domestic production exceeds domestic consumption) have responded with a race to build 
additional LNG export facilities and to secure associated LNG supply contracts. 
Canada is in a unique position within this global context. By virtue of the rapid production 
increases in the United States, Canada’s only export market for natural gas has been shrinking. 
In addition, inexpensive natural gas produced in the northeast U.S. has been supplanting western 
Canadian supplies in the eastern Canadian market. As a result, despite significant natural gas 
reserves and improved extraction technology, Canada’s natural gas production has marginally 
declined over the last decade.
Future sustained growth in natural gas production in Canada is expected to be contingent on 
producers gaining access to higher priced overseas markets. This in turn is contingent on Canada 
entering the global LNG market via the construction of LNG export facilities. The past six years 
have seen numerous proposals for facilities on Canada’s East and West coasts. As of April 2018, 
however, only a single small-scale project had reached a positive final investment decision (FID) 
and no projects have started construction. 
Within this context, this paper provides an overview of the current state of global LNG markets 
and a brief future outlook. It starts with a short review of historical patterns in international natural 
gas consumption, supply, trade and pricing. It then provides a summary of the current global LNG 
market, looking at how demand for LNG imports and liquefaction capacity have evolved in recent 
years. Last, it looks ahead and considers how the patterns in the natural gas market are expected to 
change, and the implications of these changes on the global LNG market, as well as the opportunity 
for Canada within this market.
1 
Small amounts of LNG are also used as a transportation fuel in maritime vessels and commercial road transport (trucks), 
primarily as an alternative to heavy fuel oil and diesel. It is currently a niche market, however, and demand is relatively 
insignificant. For example, in 2012 LNG demand for the transport sector was less than five billion cubic metres (BCM). 
In contrast, total LNG trade in 2012 was 319 BCM (Wood Mackenzie 2014; Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 2016; 
International Energy Agency 2017a).
2 
LNG demand grew from 2005 to 2010, was fairly stagnant from 2010 to 2015 and is predicted to start growing again from 
2016 onward (BP 2017; International Energy Agency 2017a).
3RECENT TRENDS IN GLOBAL NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION
Natural gas currently represents a significant proportion of the world’s energy use, and its share 
has been increasing over time. In 2014 it constituted 21 per cent of world primary energy supply, 
behind coal (29 per cent) and oil (31 per cent) (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 2014 GLOBAL PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY SHARES
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Global demand for natural gas rose 2.4 per cent between 2005 and 2015, increasing from 2,866 to 
3,571 billion cubic metres (BCM) (Figure 2). Much of this growth has been driven by developing 
countries in Asia and in the Middle East. Total consumption in the Asia and Oceania region3 
increased by 68 per cent from 2005 to 2015 while consumption in the Middle East4 increased by 82 
per cent. The largest single source of natural gas demand growth was China, where consumption 
increased by almost 300 per cent (50 to 193 BCM per year) between 2005 and 2015. This is not 
surprising, given the intense economic growth in China over this period. In contrast, consumption 
of natural gas increased by only 23 per cent in North America and declined by 18 per cent in 
Europe5 over the same 10-year period. 
3 
We use the International Energy Agency’s definition of the Asia and Oceania region, which includes the following 
countries: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, China (People’s Republic of and Hong Kong), Chinese Taipei, 
Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam and Other Asia. Other Asia includes Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Macau, China, Maldives, New 
Caledonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga and Vanuatu. 
4 
The Middle East region includes the following countries: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
5 
We define Europe to include continental Europe and Eurasian countries located to the west of Russia. This includes the 
following countries: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark,  Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. We do not include Kosovo as natural gas data is not available.
4FIGURE 2 GLOBAL NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
serte
m cibuc noilli
B
North America Europe Russia & Eurasia Asia & Oceania Central & South America Africa Middle East
Source: International Energy Agency (2017f)
Looking ahead, natural gas can be expected to be a part of the global energy mix for the long 
term as its end uses continue to diversify. In particular, it is expected to play an important role 
in preliminary climate action activities as it is a less carbon-intensive alternative to coal for use 
in both industrial processes and electricity generation.6 As the development of renewable energy 
sources has not yet been sufficient to replace fossil fuel sources of energy, natural gas is becoming 
a bridging fuel that many countries are adopting as part of their transition to cleaner energy 
sources. Even in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) “Sustainable Development Scenario,”7 
fossil fuels remain at 61 per cent of final energy demand in 2040, with a strong role for natural gas. 
In particular, natural gas is the only fossil fuel that sees an increase in production (+17 per cent) 
(Figure 3) and consumption (+19 per cent) relative to 2014. In contrast, production and consumption 
of coal are forecast to decline by over 50 per cent each while production and consumption of oil are 
each forecast to decline by nearly 25 per cent. 
It is important to note, however, that the potential for sustained, long-run growth in natural gas 
demand is uncertain and will depend on the future stringency of climate change policies. This 
is because although natural gas is cleaner than coal it is still a carbon-emitting fossil fuel, and 
could be subject to future policy action. For example, simulations by the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) of the Obama Administration's proposed U.S. Clean Power Plan suggested 
that in the short term, natural gas would replace a majority of the coal phased out under the Clean 
Power Plan (U.S. EIA 2015a).8 In the longer term – 2030 and beyond – however, the EIA forecasted 
only small shifts in the amount of electricity generated by coal and natural gas. Long-term rising 
electricity demand would be supported by an expansion in renewable generation technologies, 
which were forecast to increase their generation capacity by over 80 per cent from 2020 to 2040. 
6 
For example, estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicate that in the U.S., energy generated 
by natural gas has 44 per cent fewer carbon dioxide emissions per BTU than energy generated by coal (U.S. EIA 2016a).
7 
This scenario assumes policies will be put in place to limit global temperature increases to 2°C, improve energy access in 
developing countries and reduce air pollution.
8 
The U.S. federal government under the Obama Administration developed the Clean Power Plan in 2014 and announced it 
in 2015. Numerous states quickly challenged its legality in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, 
and in February 2016 the Supreme Court placed its implementation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on 
hold until the lower court reached a decision (Hurley and Volovici 2016). President Donald Trump regularly expressed 
his opposition to the Clean Power Plan during the 2016 election campaign and in March 2017 signed an executive order 
requiring the EPA to review the order and to decide whether to suspend, revise or rescind it (White House 2017). The EPA 
responded to this order in October 2017 when it issued a formal proposal to repeal the Clean Power Plan (U.S. EPA 2017). 
5FIGURE 3 FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION UNDER IEA NEW POLICIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS 
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The forecasts from the IEA in the World Energy Outlook also clearly demonstrate the expected 
impact of climate policy stringency on the production and consumption paths of natural gas. In 
the “New Policies” scenario, which assumes countries introduce and enforce policies to meet 
previously announced emissions reduction commitments, production and consumption of all fossil 
fuels are expected to increase between 2015 and 2040. The strongest growth rate is for natural gas, 
with production forecast to steadily increase at a compound annual rate of 1.5 per cent. In contrast, 
in the aforementioned “Sustainable Development Scenario,” the anticipated compound annual 
growth rate in natural gas production is significantly lower at 0.5 per cent. Additionally, rather 
than steadily increasing, natural gas production is forecast to peak in 2030 and then hold relatively 
constant over the remainder of the forecast period.
GLOBAL NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
In 2016, global natural gas reserves were 194,782 BCM, according to data from the EIA (U.S. EIA 
2017). As depicted in Figure 4, the world’s largest natural gas reserves are located in the Middle 
East (79,804 BCM), and Russia and Eurasia9 (60,600 BCM). Despite having the world’s largest 
reserves of natural gas, the Middle East lags significantly behind Russia and Eurasia in production. 
This is largely because natural gas markets are regionally constrained due to an historical lack of 
infrastructure to facilitate interaction between overseas markets. With substantial pipeline capacity 
running from Russia to Europe – which has notably smaller natural gas reserves (4,815 BCM in 
2016) – Russia and Eurasia have access to a large export market that has historically accounted for 
approximately 20 per cent of world consumption. The Middle East, in contrast, has very limited 
natural gas pipeline access to Europe10 and the majority of its LNG export capacity has only been 
developed since 2004.
9 
We include the following countries in our definition of Russia and Eurasia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
10 
The only natural gas pipeline connecting the Middle East with Europe is the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline that runs from Iran  
to Turkey. 
6FIGURE 4 2016 GLOBAL NATURAL GAS RESERVES
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2017)
Russia and Eurasia is one of the world’s largest producing regions of natural gas, accounting for 
25 per cent of global production between 2005 and 2015 (IEA 2017f). Production over that period 
has varied between 725 and 875 BCM per year (Figure 5). The Middle East, in contrast, accounted 
for only 14 per cent of global natural gas production over this period. Middle East production 
has been sharply growing, however, rising from 300 BCM in 2005 to 573 BCM in 2015. The 
Middle East’s share of global production correspondingly grew from 10 to 16 per cent. The rise in 
production has been driven by the increase in demand for natural gas in the Middle East, as well as 
a sharp increase in LNG export capacity. Specifically, over the period of 2004 to 2011, LNG export 
capacity in the Middle East increased from 29 to 100.8 million tonnes per annum (MTPA). This 
corresponds to an increase in natural gas export capacity of approximately 98 BCM.11 
11 
The Middle East has not added any further LNG export capacity since 2011, nor does it have any LNG export facilities 
under active construction (International Gas Union, 2017). Qatar announced in July 2017, however, an intention to increase 
its export capacity by an additional 23 MTPA by 2022 to 2024 (DiChristopher, 2017). 
7FIGURE 5 GLOBAL NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
serte
m cibuc noilli
B
North America Europe Russia & Eurasia Asia & Oceania Central & South America Africa Middle East
Source: International Energy Agency (2017f)
Narrowly edging out Russia and Eurasia, the world’s largest natural gas producing region over 
the last 10 years is North America. Despite accounting for only six per cent of global reserves 
(11,950 BCM), North America accounted for 26 per cent of global production from 2005 to 
2015. Production steadily increased over this period, rising from 742 to 975 BCM. This increase 
is largely attributable to the commercialization of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
techniques, and the corresponding boom in shale gas production in the U.S. As noted earlier, 
Canadian production declined slightly over this same period, predominantly as a result of declining 
demand for natural gas imports in the U.S.
The Asia and Oceania region is similar to Europe in that it has small natural gas reserves relative 
to its demand. At 15,325 BCM, reserves in the region account for slightly less than eight per cent of 
global reserves. With a high demand for natural gas driven by its large population, the region has 
historically produced more natural gas than the Middle East,12 accounting for 14 per cent of global 
production from 2005 to 2015. However, the region is also heavily reliant on external suppliers, 
with imports of known external origin accounting for 20 to 25 per cent of its consumption in 
recent years. Unlike Europe, it has limited pipeline connections to areas of significant supply and 
therefore relies primarily on LNG imports from the Middle East, as well as smaller amounts from 
Africa and Russia. Looking ahead, shale gas production has the potential to change the market 
dynamics in the Asia and Oceania region. China is already producing natural gas from its shale 
gas reserves – the world’s largest (U.S. EIA 2015d) – and Australia has significant reserves that 
it is starting to explore. Total natural gas production in the region (from conventional and shale 
resources) has been steadily rising, increasing by 44 per cent from 2005 to 2015. When paired with 
rapid growth in natural gas consumption, however, the region continues to be heavily reliant on 
external imports. 
Looking ahead, infrastructure for natural gas trade will be critical to getting natural gas from 
source countries to areas of consumption. Pipelines remain the primary delivery mechanism for 
natural gas but, as seen by historical trade and production patterns, they are constrained by fixed 
routes that cannot always connect areas of high reserves with areas of high demand. Pipelines can 
also be challenging to build across international boundaries and oceans. LNG, in contrast, offers 
the opportunity for exporting countries to access worldwide markets. This provides countries with 
the additional benefit of the flexibility to adjust deliveries in response to changing international 
12 
The Asia and Oceania region produced more natural gas than the Middle East from 2005 through to 2011. The Middle East 
surpassed its production in 2012 and has remained higher over the last four years. 
8market conditions. However, the feasibility of these adjustments depends on the supply contract 
structure. Historically, standard LNG supply contracts tended to be high-volume and long-term. 
However, the market is increasingly moving towards smaller shorter-term contracts (Royal Dutch 
Shell plc. 2017). This shift represents a trade-off between the certainty of return on investment 
(under high-volume long-term contracts) towards flexibility to exploit new and changing 
international market dynamics (under lower-volume shorter-term contracts) (Hartley 2014; 
Stapczynski 2016). As the IEA has noted, a specific feature that U.S. projects offer is freedom from 
destination clauses, which is bringing increasing flexibility to LNG markets (IEA 2016).
GLOBAL NATURAL GAS TRADE AND PRICING 
The gaseous nature of natural gas makes it more difficult to trade relative to other energy sources. 
The limited ability to distribute natural gas across major bodies of water via pipelines has 
constrained interactions between international gas markets and has resulted in price separation 
between some markets around the world. As a result of this physical constraint regional markets 
have developed, each with its own pricing point and energy-content characteristics. Monthly 
natural gas prices for major global pricing points are shown in Figure 6. There is clear volatility 
and regional variation in the prices, though recently the prices have exhibited greater convergence.
In Canada and the United States, the price of natural gas is determined by competitive markets. 
The price at any given time depends on production and exploration, storage, weather patterns, 
transportation constraints, the pricing and availability of competing energy sources, as well as 
market participants’ views of future trends, and potentially other variables not identified here. 
Natural gas prices reflect an integrated supply-and-demand network, as well as an integrated 
pipeline network. Notably, increasing production of shale gas resources in recent years has created 
oversupply conditions and depressed local North American prices below international benchmarks. 
This has contributed to substantial North American interest in developing LNG export capacity. 
FIGURE 6 MONTHLY NATURAL GAS AND LNG PRICES FOR SELECTED HUBS
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Note: BTU refers to British Thermal Unit, and is a measure of heat. Historical natural gas monthly average spot prices 
correspond to the following Bloomberg indices: NBP (NBPGWTHN Index), TTF (TTFGDAHD Index), Zeebrugge 
(ZEEBWTHN Index), NCG (EGTHDAHD Index) PEG Nord (PNXIGNWD Index), Henry Hub (NGUSHHUB) and Japan LNG 
(LNGJLNJP). Prices are converted to US dollars using monthly exchange rate averages reported by the International 
Monetary Fund. 
9Other regions have historically had less robust markets for natural gas and have subsequently relied 
more on long-term contracts to set prices.13 Prior to the last decade, Russian natural gas contracts 
were predominantly linked to oil prices; however, in recent years such contracts have increasingly 
introduced elements of hub indexation (linking the contract price to established spot market hub 
pricing). This has led to a convergence of the Russian supply price and the European spot price as 
represented by the U.K. National Balancing Point (NBP) price (Dickel et al. 2014). Specifically, 
Dickel et al. find the Russian markup vs. NBP spot price fell from a recent high of over $100/MCM 
to $0/MCM between 2009 and 2013.
Following the same trend, prices for LNG have begun to move away from oil price indexing and 
towards spot market hub-based pricing.14 This move has largely been driven by the potential of 
LNG supply from North America, which has promoted the use of the Henry Hub natural gas price 
(the North American benchmark) as a convenient benchmark against which to hedge LNG contract 
prices. As an example, Cheniere Energy, an LNG exporter on the U.S. Gulf Coast, has signed 
contracts where the price of LNG is equal to the sum of 115 per cent of the Henry Hub price plus a 
flat liquefaction fee (Cheniere Energy 2017).
As noted above, there is a mismatch globally between significant areas of natural gas demand 
and their productive capacity. Despite this, the majority of global natural gas consumption 
(approximately 70 per cent) occurs from indigenous production (Figure 7). The majority of the 
remaining 30 per cent is delivered by pipelines, with LNG-sourced natural gas increasing from 
seven per cent of consumption in 2005 to nine per cent in 2015.
Figure 8 shows the resultant trade patterns and markets for natural gas. Notably, North and South 
America engage in limited natural gas trade, either via pipeline or LNG. In contrast, Europe and 
Asia are substantial demand centres and engage in significant trade. Europe’s cohesive geography 
has led to a reliance on pipeline-borne natural gas trade, whereas Asia relies almost entirely on 
LNG for natural gas imports. We also see the Middle East’s role as a supply hub for LNG; its 
location enables it to supply both Europe and Asia.
FIGURE 7 GLOBAL NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION BY SUPPLY SOURCE
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Note: We calculate world indigenous consumption as world indigenous production minus world pipeline trade and world 
LNG trade. As a result it does not include indigenous consumption from inventory sources.
13 
For an overview of different world pricing mechanisms, see Stern (2012).
14 
Oil price indexing for LNG contracts is a relic of the first LNG contracts between Japan and its suppliers in the 1960s. The 
primary alternative energy source was oil, leading to the price of LNG being linked to the price of oil on a heat-equivalent basis.
10
FIGURE 8  2015 GLOBAL NATURAL GAS TRADE FLOWS (BILLION CUBIC METRES) & 2016 LNG PRICES  
($USD PER MILLION BTU)
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Note: The above figure does not show minor trade movements of natural gas and LNG.
GLOBAL LNG MARKETS
Global LNG imports increased rapidly from 2005 to 2011, rising from 193 to 334 BCM annually 
(Figure 9). LNG imports have stayed relatively constant since then, averaging 324 BCM annually 
over the period of 2011 to 2015. The rise in LNG demand has been supported by a sharp increase 
in global LNG liquefaction terminals. Specifically, from 2005 to 2015 the number of liquefaction 
terminals increased from 20 terminals in 13 countries to 38 terminals in 20 countries. As shown in 
Figure 10, global liquefaction capacity correspondingly increased by over 90 per cent, rising from 
175 to 340 MTPA (corresponding to approximately 239 to 462 BCM of natural gas annually). The 
majority of this growth was observed in the Middle East and has helped to ease the market access 
constraint that the region previously faced. Strong growth has also been observed in Asia and 
Oceania, where demand for LNG is high, and in Africa which – similar to the Middle East – has 
significant regional reserves and a lack of pipeline access to regions with high demand.
11
FIGURE 9 GLOBAL LNG IMPORTS
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Note: Russia & Eurasia is not shown in the figure as the region did not have any LNG imports from 2005 to 2015.
The primary regions that import LNG are Europe, and Asia and Oceania. Together, these regions 
accounted for 90 per cent of global LNG demand over the period of 2005 to 2015. Prior to 2011, 
significant growth in LNG demand was observed in both Europe and Asia. Specifically, demand 
in Europe increased by 79 per cent from 2005 to 2011, while demand in Asia increased by 71 per 
cent. Since 2011 LNG demand in Asia has continued to rise, increasing by an additional seven per 
cent. Demand in Europe, in contrast, has contracted, declining by close to 40 per cent since 2011. 
European imports of LNG in 2015 were only 15 per cent higher than imports in 2005.
FIGURE 10 GLOBAL LNG LIQUEFACTION CAPACITY
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Note: The indicated capacity figures include all global facilities outside of Libya. Libya (3.2 MTPA) is excluded as its 
facility was severely damaged in the country’s 2011 civil war (U.S. EIA 2015b) and has not produced any LNG since then. 
Similar to Libya, Yemen’s export facility (6.7 MTPA) stopped operating in April 2015 as a result of civil war. Its capacity 
has been counted, however, as although there is no indication of when the facility might come back online, there are also 
no confirmed reports that it is not intact. A number of facilities around the world are in good repair but are not operating 
due to a lack of natural gas supply. Most notably, the Damietta facility in Egypt has not been operational since 2012. The 
Idku LNG facility in Egypt similarly did not operate in 2015 as a result of Egypt’s supply shortage but restarted with a 
small number of shipments in 2016. Last, the Kenai LNG project in Alaska did not export any cargoes in 2016 (IGU 2017).
12
Increases in European LNG demand were most evident in 2006 and again in 2009 and 2010. 
European consumption of natural gas over this period was erratic – it was relatively constant from 
2005 to 2006, fell in 2008 and 2009 and grew in 2010 – suggesting changing consumption was 
not a main determinant in the growth of LNG demand. Rather, these increases were largely driven 
by the opening of new regasification terminals – in the United Kingdom in 2005 and in both Italy 
and the United Kingdom in 2009 – in response to declining indigenous production. A portion of 
the latter increases can also likely be linked back to the January 2009 conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine during which Russia cut off pipeline natural gas exports to Ukraine for nearly a three-
week period (Perani, Stern and Yafimava 2009). As 80 per cent of Russian natural gas pipeline 
exports to Europe transited through Ukraine at this time, this significantly reduced Russian supply 
to other European countries. The decline in European LNG imports since 2011 can be explained 
in part by a return to Russian imports, largely enabled by the 2011 completion of the Nord Stream 
pipeline, which runs from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. Additionally, European natural 
gas demand was declining from 2010 to 2014 while LNG demand and LNG prices were rising in 
Asia. As a result, LNG exporters preferred Asia as a target market.
The steady growth in LNG imports in Asia and Oceania is attributable to steadily increasing 
natural gas consumption. This in turn is attributable to two factors. First is the rapid 
industrialization, and accompanying growing natural gas demand, of developing economies in Asia 
– most notably China and India. Second is the Fukushima Daichi nuclear incident that occurred 
in the aftermath of the March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. Japan shut down its nuclear 
power facilities after the incident and its total primary energy supply shifted drastically, moving 
from 15 per cent nuclear and 17 per cent natural gas in 2010 to six per cent nuclear and 22 per cent 
natural gas in 2011 (IEA 2017c). Accordingly, Japan’s imports of LNG increased by 18 per cent 
from 2010 to 2011 and continued to rise steadily through to 2014 (IEA 2017a). From 2014 to 2015 
LNG demand in Japan decreased by six per cent. This decline in LNG demand corresponded to the 
continued expansion of Japan’s renewable energy sources (IEA 2017c), as well as the restart in 2015 
of two of Japan’s nuclear reactors (U.S. EIA 2016b). 
Despite the rapid rise in global LNG demand since 2005 it remains a relatively small portion of 
total natural gas trade. Specifically, from 2005 to 2009 LNG accounted for approximately 25 per 
cent of the total annual global trade in natural gas. The short-lived increase in European demand 
for LNG in 2010, followed by the longer term bump-up in Japan’s demand for LNG in 2011 has 
increased LNG’s market share in recent years to close to one-third. With future global growth in 
natural gas demand forecast to be concentrated in the Asia and Oceania region – and with only 
limited pipeline capacity connecting this region with large producers within the region and with 
producers in the Middle East and Russia and Eurasia – the proportion of global natural gas trade 
through LNG is expected to steadily increase in the years ahead (BP 2017). 
GLOBAL NATURAL GAS OUTLOOK
Future demand for natural gas will be influenced by a number of factors, most notably the rate 
of economic growth in developing economies, the strength of climate commitments in both 
developing and developed countries, and country-level decisions around future reliance on nuclear 
power. As noted earlier, the largest determinant is likely to be the strength of climate commitments, 
and in particular, the extent to which natural gas is used as a bridging fuel versus the speed at 
which countries transition towards renewable and other non-carbon emitting sources of energy, or 
emissions-reducing technologies are installed. The IEA considers three scenarios for future energy 
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demand in its World Energy Outlook. In the least stringent “Current Policies Scenario,”15 natural 
gas consumption is forecast to reach 5,700 BCM in 2040, a 61 per cent increase relative to 2015. 
In contrast, in the most stringent “Sustainable Development Scenario,” natural gas consumption is 
forecast to reach only 4,200 BCM in 2040, an increase of 19 per cent relative to 2015. 
The reference case and “middle ground” scenario in the IEA’s World Energy Outlook is the “New 
Policies Scenario.”16 In this scenario, natural gas consumption is forecast to grow by nearly 50 
per cent between 2015 and 2040, reaching 5,300 BCM in 2040. Within this scenario, the largest 
driver of natural gas demand growth is economic growth in developing economies. Specifically, in 
Asia and Oceania total demand for natural gas is forecast to more than double from 2015 to 2040, 
rising by 770 BCM. Over two thirds of this increase is driven by rising demand in China and India. 
Although significantly smaller consumers, similarly strong growth rates are expected in the Middle 
East (+72 per cent/+333 BCM), Africa (+134 per cent/+175 BCM) and Central and South America 
(+60 per cent/+102 BCM) (Figure 11). In Russia and Eurasia natural gas consumption is forecast 
to increase by only 13 per cent (+73 BCM). When excluding Russia, however, where natural gas 
consumption is forecast to grow only marginally over the next 25 years, the expected growth rate 
for this region increases to 41 per cent. 
The impact of climate commitments within the “New Policies Scenario” is most noticeable in 
the more moderate upward trend of natural gas consumption in regions dominated by developed 
countries. In particular, consumption in Europe is forecast to rise by 13 per cent from 2015 to 2040. 
While this is only a small increase, it is a reversal of the downward trend that saw European natural 
gas consumption fall by 18 per cent from 2005 to 2015. In North America, natural gas consumption 
is forecast to grow by 19 per cent. This is consistent with the expectation that electricity generation 
in both the United States and Canada will make a significant shift from coal to natural gas 
(National Energy Board 2016; U.S. EIA 2018). 
FIGURE 11 GLOBAL NATURAL GAS DEMAND OUTLOOK
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Note: This outlook corresponds to the IEA’s “New Policies Scenario” which assumes that all policies and implementing 
measures that affect energy markets and which were either adopted or declared as of mid-2017 are put into effect.
15 
The “Current Policies Scenario” accounts for the impact of only those climate policies that have been “firmly enacted as of 
mid-2017.” It is primarily meant to serve as a benchmark path against which the impact of more stringent policies can be 
measured (IEA 2017d). 
16 
The “New Policies Scenario” assumes all policies and implementing measures that affect energy markets and which were 
either adopted or declared as of mid-2017 are put into effect.
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The largest natural gas-producing regions are expected to continue to be North America and 
Russia and Eurasia, which are forecast to account for an average of 25 per cent and 21 per cent of 
global production in 2040 respectively (Figure 12). North American production is anticipated to 
grow faster than North American demand. Although the majority of natural gas will be consumed 
domestically over the entire forecast period, the amount available for export is expected to increase 
steadily, rising from only one per cent in 2015 to 15 per cent in 2040 (Figure 13). The majority of 
these exports will be in the form of LNG. 
In Russia and Eurasia production is similarly expected to grow faster than consumption. The 
availability of natural gas for export is forecast to increase from an average of 33 per cent of 
production in 2015 to 42 per cent of production in 2040. Although Russia is expanding its export 
capacity through the construction of LNG liquefaction facilities and new pipelines,17 the majority  
of these exports will most likely target Europe via existing pipeline infrastructure. 
The other main producing regions of natural gas are expected to be Asia and Oceania at an average of 
17 per cent of global natural gas production in 2040, and the Middle East at an average of 19 per cent. 
In keeping with recent trends, production growth in Asia and Oceania will be insufficient to keep up 
with the region’s growing demand. The shortfall in regional production relative to regional demand 
is forecast to increase from 30 per cent in 2015 to 65 per cent in 2040. Although there are some plans 
to extend pipeline infrastructure in the region, due to its geography it is likely to rely primarily on 
imports in the form of LNG. The opposite scenario is present in the Middle East where production 
in the region is expected to consistently exceed demand by approximately 20 per cent. Again, due to 
the region’s geography and a limited number of pipelines the majority of this excess production will 
likely be exported as LNG to either Europe or Asia and Oceania. 
FIGURE 12 GLOBAL NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION OUTLOOK
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17 
Russia, for example, is considering two new natural gas export pipelines to China. For more information, see Henderson (2014).
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FIGURE 13 ACTUAL AND PROJECTED REGIONAL NATURAL GAS SURPLUS (+) AND DEFICIT (-) BY REGION
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Note: The World Energy Outlook 2017 does not provide a forecast for production and consumption of natural gas in 
2020. The 2020 values as shown on the figure are therefore estimates, and are equal to the average of the observed 
surplus (deficit) for a region in 2015 and the forecast surplus (deficit) for a region in 2025. 
Natural gas production is also forecast to grow in Central and South America. It maintains a near 
identical pace to consumption growth, however, and the natural gas surplus/deficit in the region 
remains close to zero over the entire forecast period. 
The projection for Africa is a modest but growing trend in the region’s natural gas production and 
the availability of that production for export. However, this projected trend faces considerable 
uncertainty, largely due to the substantial barriers to investment and growing domestic demand in 
Algeria. Algeria is Africa’s largest producer and exporter of natural gas. Algerian domestic natural 
gas consumption continues to grow due to a sustained government policy of low domestic prices. 
This in turn has weakened the outlook for production growth as the low domestic prices have not 
provided investment incentives to further exploit domestic resources (Aissaoui 2016). This growing 
concern is already reflected in the historical trend of regional exports from Africa. Between 
2010 and 2015, weak production growth in Africa has fallen well short of the growth in regional 
demand, leading to a 20 per cent reduction in overall exports from the region, falling from 103 to 
80 BCM (IEA 2016). North Africa also has a pipeline link to Europe which, taken together with the 
pessimistic view of Algerian production, suggests that LNG exports from Africa will at most play 
only a minor role in global LNG trade in the near future. That said, however, Mozambique has been 
subject to investment interest, and could be a significant source of African supply in the mid- to 
late-2020s.18
The only region where natural gas production is expected to decrease over the forecast period is 
in Europe. With consumption in this region forecast to grow, the shortfall in regional production 
relative to regional demand is forecast to rise from 100 per cent in 2015 to 168 per cent in 2040. 
The degree to which Europe turns to LNG as a future supply source will likely depend largely on 
the export infrastructure that is developed globally over the next number of years. In particular, 
in addition to significant existing pipeline infrastructure connecting Europe with Russia and 
Eurasia, the Middle East and North Africa, there are a number of new pipelines either under 
18 
For example, the Mozambique LNG project’s (12 MTPA) FID is expected in 2018 (Tsukimori 2017), and the Coral South 
project (3.3 MTPA) has signed long-term contracts for the project’s entire capacity and made its FID in June 2017 (Eni 
Inc. 2017). The Mozambique project, if it proceeds, will be a large supplier within Africa, but overall Africa will remain a 
relatively small player.
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active development or consideration.19 As natural gas is less expensive to transport by pipeline, a 
significant growth in pipeline export capacity could limit the growth potential for LNG.
The largest determinant of future natural gas supply is likely to be the extent to which tight 
and shale gas reserves are developed. Public and political acceptance of hydraulic fracturing to 
develop these resources has thus far been inconsistent around the world and continues to evolve. 
Various jurisdictions within North America and Europe have enacted moratoriums or bans on 
fracking in light of potential evidence that the practice may contribute to minor local earthquakes 
(BC Oil and Gas Commission 2014) and groundwater contamination (U.S. EPA 2015). While 
continued development of shale and other unconventional gas resources has the potential to 
create future natural gas supply that is in significant excess of demand, if concern over hydraulic 
fracturing techniques becomes more widespread then future anticipated production growth may be 
significantly tempered.
GLOBAL LNG OUTLOOK
As noted a number of times throughout this paper, many natural gas-producing regions have 
abundant resource reserves and production capacity relative to domestic demand. This imbalance 
can be exacerbated by constrained access to international markets that traditional pipelines 
cannot reach. Of the four world regions that are forecast to have future natural gas production that 
significantly exceeds demand – Russia and Eurasia, the Middle East, Africa and North America – 
only Russia and Eurasia has significant or planned pipeline access to external demand markets.
Shipping natural gas as LNG is costlier than pipeline transport, primarily because of the 
significant financial investments that are required to develop LNG liquefaction, regasification 
and transportation capabilities. However, it is often the only option for producers that either do 
not have connections to international natural gas pipelines or want to reach overseas markets for 
which pipeline transport is not an option. 
While a small number of countries have had LNG production capabilities for decades – most notably 
Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia – the vast majority of current 
global LNG export capacity (75 per cent) has come online only since 1999. New market entrants are 
facing domestic over-supply and are seeking new markets for their natural gas. The country with 
the world’s largest LNG export capacity, for example, is Qatar. It opened its first terminal with two 
liquefaction trains and 6.4 MTPA of export capacity in 1997. It has added six additional terminals 
and 12 liquefaction trains since then and had a total LNG export capacity in 2014 of 77 MTPA 
(corresponding to approximately 105 BCM of natural gas), accounting for just under 25 per cent of 
the global total. It has correspondingly ramped up its LNG exports by nearly 30 times – from 3.5 
BCM of natural gas in 1997 to nearly 100 BCM in 2015 (IEA 2017a). 
As noted earlier, global LNG export capacity in 2016 was 340 MTPA. This corresponds to a 
liquefaction capacity of approximately 462 BCM of natural gas. The 2017 edition of the BP Energy 
Outlook forecasts that global liquefaction capacity will increase by two-thirds between 2016 and 
2035, reaching approximately 775 BCM per year. Nearly a third of this anticipated growth is 
attributable to projects currently under development and is expected to be realized by 2020. The 
majority of the growth in LNG capacity will be realized in the United States (+196 BCM per year) 
and Australia (+124 BCM per year). 
19 
For example, in fall 2015 construction started on three new pipelines that – once connected – will move natural gas from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey, Italy, Bulgaria and Greece (U.S. EIA 2015c). There are two additional pipeline proposals for southeast 
Europe, a proposal for a second pipeline from Algeria to Italy, and finally a proposal to twin the existing Nord Stream 
pipeline that runs under the Baltic Sea and supplies Germany with natural gas from Russia (Nord Stream 2 n.d.).
17
The large number of entrants to the LNG market over the next few years is expected to lead to 
rising excess liquefaction capacity. Considering only operating LNG export projects and new 
projects that were under construction as of March 2017, LNG liquefaction capacity is expected to 
reach 613 BCM per year in 2020 (IGU 2017).20 In contrast, the IEA forecasts that LNG demand 
in 2021 will be around 460 BCM per year. This suggests a widening differential between export 
capacity and demand over the next four years (Figure 14). Specifically, if we assume that no 
additional LNG export capacity comes online in 2021, then based on the IEA’s projected demand 
for 2021, liquefaction capacity will exceed demand by over 30 per cent. If LNG demand is stagnant, 
as was the case from 2010 to 2015, then liquefaction capacity in 2021 will be nearly 50 per cent 
higher than expected demand. For the differential between LNG demand and liquefaction to close 
by 2021, demand would need to grow at a compound annualized rate of 11.3 per cent from 2015 to 
2021. This is nearly double the annual growth rate of 6.2 per cent that is consistent with the IEA’s 
projection for LNG demand in 2021. 
In addition to projects currently under construction, 88 new projects have been proposed 
worldwide but have not yet reached an FID. A further 12 facilities that are either operating or under 
construction have proposed expansion plans that are also in the pre-FID stage. Together, these 
projects represent nearly 900 MTPA (1,200 BCM) in proposed liquefaction capacity (IGU 2017). 
This is over three times the liquefaction capacity that exists today and far surpasses even the most 
optimistic forecasts for long-term LNG demand. Further challenging the prospects for new projects 
is Qatar’s announcement in July 2017 of plans to add an additional 23 MTPA (31 BCM of natural 
gas) of export capacity within the timeframe of 2022 to 2024 (DiChristopher 2017). With the global 
natural gas market unable to absorb all of the proposed liquefaction capacity it is well accepted that 
most currently proposed projects will not proceed. 
FIGURE 14 FORECAST EXCESS GLOBAL LNG LIQUEFACTION CAPACITY
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Note: Global liquefaction capacity includes all LNG projects currently operating plus new projects that were under 
construction as of March 2017. Forecast global LNG imports are calculated based on the IEA’s projection in its Medium-
Term Gas Market Report, 2016 that imports will increase by around 140 BCM between 2015 and 2021. To approximate 
annual import projections we assume that imports grow at a constant annualized rate of 6.2 per cent between 2015 
and 2021. 
20 
As of March 2017 there were no projects under construction with expected start dates beyond 2020.
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Most of the newly operating, under-construction and proposed liquefaction plants were first 
proposed or reached FIDs between 2010 and 2015. This period was frequently referred to as the 
“LNG race” as high LNG prices, particularly in Asia, incited project proponents to race to lock 
in contracts and move forward with FIDs before prices started to decline with the increase in 
supply (Marlow and Jang 2014). Precipitated by declining oil prices, the LNG price started to fall 
drastically in early 2015. In 2016, only two projects made a positive FID, for a combined capacity 
of 6.3 MTPA (IGU 2017). This followed five straight years (2011 to 2015) during which FIDs were 
taken on a minimum of 20 MTPA each year21 and was the lowest level of capacity to receive an FID 
since 2008 (GIIGNL 2017), marking what is arguably the end of the most recent LNG race. 
Despite 19 LNG project proposals on the West Coast and six on the East Coast, Canada was 
ultimately a non-entity in the LNG race. Rather, Canada is often viewed now as having lost out to 
the United States, which saw its first LNG export facility start operating in 2016. A second project 
shipped its first cargo in March 2018 while four additional projects are under construction with 
expected start dates between late 2018 and 2019. Combined, the United States is expected to have 
67.5 MTPA of export capacity in the lower 48 states by 2020,22 up from zero in 2015. In contrast, as 
of spring 2018, eight of Canada’s proposed projects have been shelved or cancelled, including the 
Pacific NorthWest LNG project in northwestern British Columbia which had previously reaching a 
positive provisional FID in June 2015.23 
The only Canadian project with an FID, announced in November 2016, is Woodfibre LNG, a small-
scale export facility (2.1 MTPA) located in Squamish, British Columbia. The project commenced 
preparation of the site in March 2017 and received its environmental assessment certificate from 
the B.C. government for construction and operation in July 2017 (Woodfibre LNG 2017). First LNG 
exports from the project are forecast for 2020. An FID for LNG Canada, also in B.C., is expected 
later in 2018. In March 2018, the B.C. NDP government stated its plan to roll back the LNG-specific 
income tax implemented by the previous Liberal government and offer other tax relief (B.C. Office 
of the Premier 2018). In Nova Scotia, Pieridae Energy filed an application to construct the Goldboro 
LNG facility with the Nova Scotia Utilities and Review Board, and is also slated to make an FID 
in 2018 (Goldboro LNG 2018). However, project proponents on the West and East coasts have 
raised concerns about the impact of carbon pricing, including differences in federal and provincial 
regulations, and a tariff on imports of pre-fabricated steel modules needed for construction of the 
facilities (Bennett 2018; Jang 2018; Morgan 2018; Murphy 2018).
Although development of new liquefaction capacity is expected to slow down over the next number 
of years, there is also the expectation that a second wave of new capacity will be required by the 
mid-2020s. The BP Energy Outlook, for example, forecasts a “temporary lull” in new liquefaction 
capacity coming online as new supplies from projects currently under construction are absorbed, but 
that growth will resume at a “more moderate pace” after this period (BP 2017). Consistent with this 
outlook is that although a small number of projects were shelved in 2016, the majority of projects 
that were due to make FIDs have opted to remain under development and defer their FIDs to a later 
year. After having been left behind in the most recent LNG race, this anticipated second wave now 
offers the best opportunity for Canada to become an active participant in the global LNG market.
21 
Annual FID capacities are reported in the GIIGNL (International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers) annual 
reports. These are available from the publications section of the GIIGNL website: http://giignl.org/publications. 
22 
Authors’ calculations based on IGU (2017).
23 
Pacific NorthWest LNG was a large-scale project (18 MTPA) proposed for northern British Columbia. The June 2015 FID 
was conditional on the project receiving approval of the project development agreement by the B.C. legislative assembly and 
receiving a positive regulatory decision from the government of Canada as a result of its environmental assessment process. 
The B.C. legislative approval was received in July 2015 but the government of Canada’s decision was not announced until 
September 2016. Although the decision was positive, it was accompanied by 190 conditions. After conducting a total review 
of the project given the additional conditions, it was announced in July 2017 that the project would be cancelled (Pacific 
NorthWest LNG 2017).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Established regional production and consumption trends have placed a growing focus on 
LNG as a transportation mode for the inter-regional trade of natural gas. In particular, large 
differentials between global natural gas prices spurred a recent race among countries with 
current and anticipated natural gas surpluses to establish LNG export capacity. With these large 
price differentials underpinning investment decisions, FIDs were taken on over 140 MTPA of 
liquefaction capacity between 2010 and 2016.24 
Many of the recent FIDs for liquefaction projects in the U.S. are the result of a significant shift in 
North America’s natural gas market. As recently as 2008,25 forecasts for natural gas supply and 
demand in North America indicated a substantial shortage, prompting investment in regasification 
facilities to import LNG. Soon after, however, advances in hydraulic fracturing technology and the 
shale revolution resulted in the development of new resource plays, and made Canada and the U.S. 
self-sufficient for many years to come. By converting many of its regasification facilities to export 
facilities, the U.S. is establishing itself as a major global LNG player. Canada had similar hopes 
of entering the global LNG market during the most recent wave of development and saw multiple 
proposals for LNG facilities on both coasts. However, as of April 2018 only a single Canadian 
project has a positive FID and no projects have started construction.
With international price differentials having narrowed significantly since 2014, and with a 
surplus of LNG liquefaction capacity forecast through to the early 2020s, proposed Canadian 
LNG facilities are facing a challenging near-term market in which to gain a foothold. New entry 
can potentially be supported by the recent movements towards shorter and smaller volume LNG 
supply contracts. This growing liquidity in international LNG markets has advantages in providing 
greater flexibility in both demand and supply side natural gas substitution. Particularly in the 
current environment, however, new LNG facilities represent a significant sunk cost and associated 
investment risk for exporters and importers. 
More promising for proposed Canadian projects is that a second wave of LNG development is 
likely on the horizon. Natural gas production surpluses continue to grow in North America and 
Russia and Eurasia, while increasing deficits are forecast for Europe and Asia and Oceania. While 
Russia and Eurasia will look to remain the dominant suppliers of exported natural gas through 
existing and new pipeline infrastructure, regional demand and supply imbalances likely cannot 
be arbitraged through pipelines alone. This will force both producers and consumers to continue 
looking towards an increasingly liquid international LNG market. However, the introduction of 
new competitors (and associated new investment) into this international market will again rely 
heavily on the ability of these individual firms and investors to manage the inherent investment 
risk. This will become increasingly important as physical investment decisions are made since, 
at present, the cumulative capacity of proposed investments far outpaces any expected increase 
in global demand for LNG imports. Proponents of Canadian projects must therefore be prepared 
to move when the next development window opens, as it is likely to be equally competitive to the 
one that just closed. Existing policies, however, such as the aforementioned tariff on steel imports, 
could prevent a Canadian LNG industry from getting off the ground, despite the promise of a new 
development window.
24 
Author calculations based on data reported in the GIIGNL annual reports. Archives of annual reports are available at:  
http://giignl.org/publications.
25 
The International Energy Outlook (IEO) 2008, published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, forecast that 
North American demand for natural gas would exceed production by approximately 10 to 13 per cent from 2015 through to 
2030 (U.S. EIA 2008). In the IEO 2009 this gap had fallen to a difference of less than five per cent and in IEO 2010 natural 
gas production in Canada and the U.S. was forecast to exceed demand (U.S. EIA 2009, U.S. EIA 2010). 
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